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INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, responding to population shifts evidenced by the 
decennial census, the New Jersey legislature enacted a reapportion­
ment plan that significantly altered the racial makeup of its state 
legislative and congressional districts .1 In the litigation following the 
enactment of the plan, evidence showed that for key state legislative 
races during the 1990s, Democratic state legislators were elected 
1. See Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001) (per curiam) (rejecting a 
challenge to New Jersey's state legislative apportionment scheme); see also N.J. CONST. art. 
IV,§ 3, 'II 1 (outlining the process by which New Jersey reapportions legislative districts). 
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primarily because of their party and their stances on issues , as opposed 
to being elected as a result of race.2 While encouraging, this evidence 
stands in stark contrast to the assumptions underlying the federal 
Voting Rights Act (VRA).3 
Congress enacted the VRA in 1965, intending to remedy the 
nation's long history of voting discrimination.4 With the social, 
political, and demographic forces of the 1960s at work, the VRA 
created a number of procedural and substantive mechanisms to 
protect the ability of African Americans to participate in, and effec­
tuate change through, the political process.5 Specifically, section 5, one 
of the VRA's key provisions, requires certain jurisdictions with 
histories of racially discriminatory voting structures and procedures to 
receive "preclearance" from the Justice Department or the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia before enacting any 
change to voting policies and procedures, including changes to the 
apportionment of representatives.6 Preclearance requires jurisdictions 
subject to section 5 to demonstrate that any changes to existing 
districting plans are not purposefully or effectually "retrogressive," 
meaning that such changes do not have the purpose or effect of 
worsening the position of minority voters in comparison to the 
jurisdiction's previous, or "benchmark," plan.7 
2 Page, 144. F. Supp. 2d. at 352-62. See generally Sam Hirsch, Unpacking Page v. 
Bartels: A Fresh Redistricting Paradigm Emerges in New Jersey, 1 ELECTION L.J. 7 (2002) 
(describing and analyzing the Page decision); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now 
at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1556-
61 (2002). 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2002). See also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-06 (implying that the white majority in the South not only disenfran­
chised the black minority, but also refused to vote for blacks simply because of their race). 
4. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5-6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 182; Voting 
Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 60 (1965) (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General of the 
United States). 
5. See generally SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY 546-47 (2d 
ed. 2001). 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Congress enacted section 5 with the express purpose of preventing 
jurisdictions from engaging in the common practice of rewriting explicitly discriminatory 
voting laws struck down by federal courts in facially harmless but effectively discriminatory 
ways. See generally Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (holding that section 5 
was intended to block voting changes that lead to a retrogression in the position of voting 
minorities). In 1973, the Supreme Court specifically held that changes to reapportionment 
necessitated the preclearance procedures outlined in section 5. Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, 541 (1973). Nine states are currently covered under section 5: Alabama, Alaska, 
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 28 C.F.R. pt. 
51 app. (2003). In addition to these states, five counties in California, five counties in Florida, 
two townships in Michigan, ten towns and townships in New Hampshire, five counties in 
New York, forty counties in North Carolina, two counties in South Dakota, and thirteen 
counties in Arizona are also covered under the Act. Id. 
7. 28 C.F.R. § 51 .54(b) (2004); see also Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994). Until 
an apportionment plan has been approved under section 5, assuming that the previous plan 
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Since the VRA's enactment, however, the racial and political 
makeup of the United States, as well as American attitudes about 
race, has shifted dramatically. 8 Various issues and political realities 
have encouraged the growth of new political identities among and 
within minority groups.9 States and political subdivisions now confront 
a multiracial political landscape with laws established in response to a 
binary, white and black political framework.10 
was valid under section 2 of the VRA and the Constitution, the previously existing plan is 
considered the benchmark for section 5 purposes. Guidance Concerning Redistricting and 
Retrogression Under Section 5 of the VRA, 66 Fed. Reg. 5412 (Jan. 18, 2001). Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has noted the difficulty in ascertaining whether a new plan has worsened 
the relative ability of minority voters to effectuate change through the voting process. 
Varying political theories suggest varying definitions of retrogression. For example, it is 
unclear whether a minority group is more powerful by being able to effectively control the 
selection of one representative or by ensuring that the group can influence numerous elec­
tions. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2003), the Court held that retrogression 
gives states "flexibility to choose one theory of effective representation over the other." 
8. See Bruce E. Cain & Kenneth P. Miller, Voting Rights Mismatch: The Challenge of 
Applying the Voting Rights Act to "Other Minorities," in VOTING RIGHTS AND 
REDISTRICTING IN THE UNITED STATES 141, 141-42 (Mark E. Rush, ed., 1998); ERIC A. 
YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL 
RIGHTS AMERICA 7 (1999) ("By the year 2000, the familiar characterization of black versus 
white will no longer describe race relations in the United States. In crucial respects, the 
twenty-first century will be a nation of minorities."); see also Cindy Rodriguez, Activists 
Encouraged by Turnout of Latinos, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2002, at Bl (noting that the 
voter turnout rates for Latino voters increased by forty-one percent in 2002 from the levels 
in 1998). While this article merely suggests that voter turnout rates are higher, as opposed to 
suggesting an increase in the number of eligible voters, increased turnout among minorities 
will arguably have a greater impact on the political process than increased numbers of 
minority voters will. See Jeffrey Pollock & Jeffrey Plaut, The Latino Vote: Lessons from New 
York and New Jersey, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS, Apr. 2002, at 9 (discussing the importance 
of Latino voting blocs in New York and New Jersey political campaigns). But see John 0. 
Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multiracing America, 
79 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2001) (arguing that the increasingly multiethnic population in 
America will not necessitate changes in the VRA). 
9. See, e.g. , Jack E. White, Erasing Trent Lott's Legacy; Republicans Have a Chance to 
Chip Away at the Most Loyal of Democrats, TIME, Jan. 13, 2003, at 35 (noting that while the 
Democratic Party has a "virtual monopoly on the black vote," a recent survey shows that 
sixty percent of blacks support public school vouchers, but almost all prominent Democrats 
are staunchly opposed to them); see also JOHN B. JUDIS & RUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING 
DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 117 (2002) ("Political majorities are always coalitions. They 
combine different, and sometimes feuding, constituencies, interest groups, religions, races, 
and classes often united by nothing other than greater dislike for the opposing party, 
candidate, and coalition."); Julie Mason, Black Ministers Back Bush Plan; President Finds 
Unlikely Allies, Foes of Faith-Based Initiative Program, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 20, 2001, at A6 
(discussing the support for President Bush's faith-based initiative program in the African­
American community, despite the fact that ninety percent of black voters voted for Al Gore 
over George W. Bush); Steve Miller, Suspicious Minds: Competition, Conflict Define Two 
Minorities, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at Al ("Black and Hispanic activists . . .  find 
common ground on some issues, such as . . .  fair housing and opposition to racial profiling."); 
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Faith-Based Funding Backed, But Church­
State Doubts Abound (April 10, 2001), at http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?Report 
ID=15 (last visited May 18, 2004). 
10. Angelo N. Ancheta & Kathryn K. Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights: Redefining 
Vote Dilution in Communities of Color, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 815, 818-21 (1993); Democracy in 
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Because Congress enacted the VRA to protect the rights of a 
single minority group,11 courts have been hesitant to address the 
growing multiracial makeup of political communities and have 
continued to view racial blocs independently.12 Yet two recent cases 
suggest that courts may be willing to shift their focus and view 
multiracial voting coalitions in a new light.13 
First, in response to New Jersey's 2001 reapportionment plan 
under section 2 of the VRA,14 the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey, in Page v. Bartels,15 acknowledged the changing nature 
of race in American politics . Ruling on the validity of the plan, a 
three-judge panel explicitly recognized that different minority groups 
frequently join together to create voting blocs to ensure a greater 
impact on the political process.16 While the court "recogniz[ ed) and 
a New America: A Symposium, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1203 (2001); see also League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987) (assuming African 
Americans and Mexican Americans could aggregate to pursue a vote-dilution claim) vacated 
and rev'd en bane on other state law grounds, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987); Page v. Bartels, 
144 F. Supp. 2d 346, 369 (D.N.J. 2001) (upholding the idea of a multiethnic vote-dilution 
claim under section 2 of the VRA). See also Cain & Miller, supra note 8, at 145 (noting that 
between late-1985 and mid-1997, there were forty-eight cases of either section 2 vote dilution 
claims or equal protection claims involving non-African-American minorities). Of these 
cases, sixteen solely involved Latinos and thirty involved Latinos along with an additional 
minority group. Ancheta & Imahara, supra, at 821. See also, e.g.,. Frank v. Forest County, 
336 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a vote-dilution claim and an equal-protection 
challenge brought by a coalition of Native-American and African-American voters). The 
Seventh Circuit did not decide on the validity of coalition suits, noting only that there are 
"cases that support the argument" for coalition suits. Id. at 575. 
11. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-417 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 (noting 
the historical disenfranchisement of the black minority at the hands of the white majority). 
12 See, e.g., Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying protection 
under the VRA because a coalition of two separate minority groups did not constitute a 
protected group under the VRA). Bloc voting is a term used to describe instances in which 
members of a particular group - racial, ethnic, language, religious, etc. - vote similarly or 
identically to other members of that group, such that the existence of a group vote can be 
discerned. See generally Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (discussing bloc voting 
and detailing the requirements for a vote-dilution claim under section 2 of the VRA). 
13. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003); Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d. 346 (D.N.J. 2001). 
See also Cain & Miller, supra note 8, at 157-59 (discussing claims under the VRA brought by 
multiracial coalitions). 
14. The Page litigation considered section 2 of the VRA, which declares unlawful all 
voting procedures that "result[] in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen . . .  to 
vote on account of race or color . . . .  " Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 362. Section 2 is a separate 
and distinct cause of action from section 5. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2510. Following 
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 520 U.S. 471 (1997) [hereinafter Bossier Parish I], a 
plan that violates section 2 is not necessarily retrogressive under section 5. Likewise, a 
retrogressive plan need not violate section 2. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2510-11 
(noting the Court's refusal "to equate a § 2 vote dilution inquiry with the § 5 retrogression 
standard"). Finally, section 2 is universally applicable; it does not simply apply to those 
jurisdictions with a history of discriminatory voting practices. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2004). 
15. 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001). 
16. Page, 144 F.  Supp. 2d. at 355-56. 
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respect[ ed] that the African-American and Hispanic commumtles 
have several differing sociological and political interests," it also found 
that the evidence presented at trial "by both Hispanic and African­
American legislators strongly suggests . . .  that the African-American 
and Hispanic communities often vote as a bloc - a fact which may be 
considered in assessing the ability of either community to elect the 
candidate of its choice."1 7 
Though the decision in Page v. Bartels did not consider section 5 of 
the VRA, 18 the court emphasized that the VRA focuses on the 
"effective" voting power of minority groups, rather than on a 
relatively simple, objective determination of whether one minority 
group comprises more than fifty percent of eligible voters in a given 
district.19 By focusing on "effective" minority districts, the court 
highlighted the ability of districts to elect minority-favored candidates 
and effectively control the outcome of the election, not the ability of a 
minority group to simply objectively influence the results of the 
election. The statement in Page, however, that the critical inquiry is 
into the effective minority districts rather than the achievement of 
strict numerical proportionality, is both correct and vital to the notion 
of coalition districts . Translated into the section 5 context, the focus on 
effective representation could profoundly impact the use of coalition 
districts.20 
Second, a more dramatic example of the recent desire to give 
jurisdictions flexibility in redistricting under section 5 stemmed from 
post-2000 census redistricting in Georgia.21 Georgia's 2000 State 
Senate plan maintained the number of majority-African-American 
districts (though with decreased percentages of African-American 
17. Id. at 358. 
18. New Jersey does not meet the standards outlined in section 4 of the VRA and thus is 
not subjected to the requirements of section 5. Section 4 of the VRA contains a triggering 
provision, under which any jurisdiction that meets the enumerated requirements must then 
comply with the nonretrogression principles in section 5. The triggering formula is designed 
to include jurisdictions that have a history of using discriminatory voting practices or have 
historically low minority-voter turnout rates. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2002); 28 CFR § 51.67 
(2003); 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2003). 
19. Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (noting that "the Bartels plan will ensure that the 
minority age population remains an effective political force); see also Cain & Miller, supra 
note 8, at 142 ("The VRA quite explicitly defines 'fairness' and 'equal opportunity' rather 
than 'proportionate division.' In practice, however, courts often use the latter as an indicator 
of the former."); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 8 (arguing that the court's holding recognized that 
the VRA focuses "on effective minority districts rather than on a simple tally of districts that 
are more than 50% African-American or more than 50% Hispanic") (emphasis in original). 
20. Pildes, supra note 2, at 1556-61. 
21.  See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct.  2498 (2003) (granting jurisdictions 
increased flexibility to reapportion under section 5 of the VRA). Note that the facts of 
Georgia v. Ashcroft limit the reach of the Court's opinion to preclearance matters involving 
the more traditional black/white political dichotomy, rather than those involving multiracial 
coalitions. 
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voters) and increased the number of " influence" districts, where black 
voters would be able to play a major, though not independently 
decisive, role in the electoral process.22 
Because Georgia is a covered jurisdiction under section 5, it 
submitted its redistricting plan to the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia to receive judicial preclearance. In the 
ensuing litigation, a three-judge panel denied preclearance to the 
Georgia State Senate apportionment scheme.23 The panel disagreed 
about whether section 5 of the VRA required the drawing of "safe 
minority districts"2 4 or if a state is allowed to draw districts where 
minorities simply have equal opportunities to participate in the 
political process, but are not guaranteed victory.25 Ultimately, the 
panel denied preclearance to the apportionment plan because 
decreasing the percentages of African-American voters in certain 
districts diminished the effective voting power of these minority voters 
in comparison to the benchmark plan. 26 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the panel's retrogression 
analysis, and reversed the district court's decision.27 The Court held 
that states should have greater flexibility in designing apportionment 
schemes under section 5.28 So long as there is no "retrogression in the 
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of 
the electoral franchise,'' covered jurisdictions may use one of a 
number of reapportionment methods.29 Under the outlined definition 
of "effective," reviewing courts should consider the "totality of the 
circumstances" to determine the relative ability of a minority group to 
impact an election.30 Some jurisdictions may create "safe" districts, in 
22. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2505-07. 
23. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated by 123 S. Ct. 2498 
(2003). Under the section 5 of the VRA, judicial preclearance may only be granted by a 
three-judge panel of the District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c 
(2000). Appeals of the panel's decisions are made directly to the United States Supreme 
Court. Id. The district court denied preclearance to the state senate redistricting plan, but 
approved the preclearance of the congressional and state house plans. 
24. A "safe minority district" is a district in which it is highly likely that minority voters 
will be able to elect a candidate of their choice. 
25. See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying 
preclearance to the state senate redistricting plan, but approving the congressional and state 
house plans). 
26. Id. at 95-97. 
27. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498 (2003) (remanding the decision to the district 
court). The Supreme Court only addressed the issue of whether the district court correctly 
denied preclearance of the state senate plan; the Court did not address the validity of the 
retrogression analysis of the congressional plan and state house plan. Id. at 2498. 
28. Id. at 2511. 
29. Id. (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)). 
30. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2512. 
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which it is very likely that minority voters will be able to elect the 
candidates of their choice,31 while others may choose to create a 
greater number of "influence" districts, in which it is likely that 
minority voters will have the ability to exert a strong force on the 
outcome of the election.32 Section 5, the Court reasoned, "does not 
dictate that a State must pick one of these methods of redistricting 
over another. "33 Instead, it "gives States the flexibility to choose one 
theory of effective representation over the other."3 4  
The Page court's acceptance of coalition districts under section 2 of 
the VRA,35 as well as the flexibility brought to the section 5 process in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, suggests that future reapportionment can include 
the use of multiracial coalitions to achieve nonretrogression under 
section 5 .36 Yet both Page and Georgia v. Ashcroft have evoked cri­
ticism from those who feel that racially driven apportionment schemes 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.37 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized two "analytically distinct" 
equal-protection challenges to apportionment schemes.38 First, prior to 
Shaw v. Reno,39 the Court held that a state may not enact a particular 
apportionment scheme to purposefully "minimize or cancel out the 
voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities."40 Second, in Shaw the 
Court articulated a new type of equal protection claim, holding that a 
reapportionment plan violates principles of equal protection when it 
"cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate 
citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without 
31. Id. at 2511 (citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1986)). 
32. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2512. 
33. Id. at 2511 .  
34. Id. at 2512. 
35. See supra note 14. 
36. See Pildes, supra note 2, at 1556-61 (suggesting that courts will soon have to address 
the issue of whether section 5 permits coalitional districts to avoid retrogression). See 
generally J. Gerald Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431 , 
440-46 (2000) (analyzing recent developments in voting-rights jurisprudence). 
37. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that while 
the use of race can render a redistricting plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the use of race "saves" a plan under section 5). As interpreted by the Court in Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), race may be used as 
the predominant factor in redistricting, as distinguished from one factor among many, only if 
the use is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. Miller, 515 U.S. 
at 911-16. 
38. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911 .  
39. Shaw v.  Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
40. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980); see also United Jewish Orgs. of 
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977). 
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sufficient justification. "4 1 In so holding, the Court noted that the Equal 
Protection Clause only permits the use of race as a predominant factor 
in redistricting if its use is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state purpose.42 
This Note analyzes the use of coalition districts in light of current 
section 5 and equal protection jurisprudence and argues that, in some 
circumstances, the Equal Protection Clause compels the use of 
coalition districts to achieve nonretrogression under section 5. Part I 
examines the use of coalition districts, using the litigation in Page v. 
Bartels as an example. It then argues that the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft permits jurisdictions to create viable43 
racial coalition districts to comply with section 5. Part II argues that 
while Georgia v. Ashcroft permits the use of coalition districts to 
achieve section 5 compliance, the doctrine of strict scrutiny review 
under the Equal Protection Clause mandates the use of such districts. 
Because coalition districts minimize the harms resulting from race­
based classifications, strict scrutiny's narrow-tailoring prong requires 
jurisdictions to create coalition districts, so long as the coalitions are 
viable and the new apportionment scheme otherwise meets the 
requirements of strict scrutiny. Finally, this Note concludes by 
cautioning that, in some areas, coalition districts will not be viable, and 
that some jurisdictions may enact racially discriminatory 
apportionment schemes under the guise of creating coalitions. As 
such, this Note argues that courts and the Justice Department must be 
cautious in permitting the use of coalition districts, and must therefore 
rigorously scrutinize whether true coalitions exist. 
41. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 652; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 (rejecting the 
contention that prior decisions indicate "that a State's assignment of voters on the basis of 
race would be subject to anything but (the] strictest scrutiny"). The Court has articulated 
two ways in which a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment scheme can bring a Shaw-style 
equal protection Claim. First, if a plaintiff demonstrates that a new district is geographically 
irregular, and thus cannot be viewed as anything other than a means of separating voters 
into different districts because of their respective races, the court must apply strict scrutiny. 
Where lines are drawn with no compelling purpose other than achieving racial segregation, 
the lines are "antithetical to our system of representative democracy" and unconstitutional. 
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647-49. Second, strict scrutiny must also be applied if plaintiffs 
demonstrate that traditional, legitimate districting principles - including compactness, 
contiguity, and respecting existing political boundaries - were "subordinated" to race. Bush 
v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916). 
42. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 653; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 ("Redistricting 
legislatures will, for example, almost always be aware of racial demographics; but it does not 
follow that race predominates in the redistricting process."). Miller thus accepts that 
jurisdictions will use race as one of many factors in redistricting, and invokes strict scrutiny 
only where race predominates over other traditional districting principles such as 
"compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions." Id. 
43. I use the term "viable" throughout this Note to refer to those districts in which it can 
be empirically demonstrated that members of an ethnic minority group exhibit racial bloc 
voting, and also vote en bloc with a different ethnic minority. 
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I. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS AND VOTING TRENDS: COALITION 
DISTRICTS AS A NEW APPROACH TO RACE AND VOTING 
The changing nature of race relations and demographics has forced 
a new debate on the formation and prevalence of cross-racial voting 
coalitions in American politics. 4 4  While some jurisdictions remain in 
the binary racial world understood by the framers of the VRA, 45 
others have demographics that indicate the ability to create multiracial 
political communities. 46 In some communities with multiracial 
populations, ethnic groups are unable to forge political coalitions 
across racial lines. 4 7  In these instances, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged "society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes 
necessitate majority-minority districts to ensure equal political and 
electoral opportunity . . . .  "48 In other instances, communities exist 
44. Pildes, supra note 2, at 1551-67; see also John Hart Ely, Policing the Process of 
Representation: The Court as Referee, in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 
18, 24 (John H. Garvey et al. eds., 5th ed. 2004) (noting that "effective majorities can usually 
be described as clusters of cooperating minorities"). 
45. See Calmore, supra note 8, at 1255-56 (arguing that southern states have maintained 
the biracial demographics underlying the Voting Rights Act); see generally Ancheta & 
Imhara, supra note 10 (discussing a multiracial approach to voting-rights jurisprudence). 
46. See, e.g. , Peter W. Wielhouwer, White Cities Electing Black Mayors? Challenging 
Preconceived Notions of Racial Voting Patterns (2000), at http://www.regent.edu/acad/ 
schgov/petewie/articles/home.html (last visited May 18, 2004). Regardless of the viability of 
multiethnic voting coalitions under the VRA, multiracial coalitions exist in states and 
localities across America. Id. For example, in 1999, among the 29 cities with both 
populations greater than 100,000 and with an African-American mayor, 12 cities had 
populations that were more than 50% white. Id. For example, in Minneapolis, which is 77% 
white, Sharon Belton served as mayor. Id. In Des Moines, a city that is more than 87% 
white, Preston Daniels was elected mayor. Id. Mayors Belton and Daniels are both African 
American. Id. Additionally, of the African-American mayors serving in these twenty-nine 
cities, eighteen (62%) of them serve cities that do not have a majority African-American 
population, and thirteen (45%) of the mayors served cities with less than 40% African­
American population. Seven of the African-American mayors were elected in cities that 
were more than 60% white. Id. Furthermore, in the 2001 New York City mayoral election, 
Democratic candidate Fernando Ferrer, a Puerto Rican, received strong support from black 
voters and the endorsement of African-American Rev. Al Sharpton. Miller, supra note 9. 
Additionally, in the 2000 mayoral election in Philadelphia, black Democrat John Street was 
elected with vast support from the city's Hispanics. Id. In 1998, African-American Senator 
Carol Moseley-Braun received 83% of the Hispanic vote in her failed reelection bid. Id. 
47. Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that African­
American and Hispanic communities were not a politically cohesive group); Concerned 
Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 
1990) (noting that the African-American and Hispanic communities are not politically 
cohesive); Aldasoro v. Kennerson, 922 F. Supp. 339, 375 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that 
African Americans and Whites were not sufficiently politically cohesive to be grouped as a 
single "non-Hispanic" voting bloc); see also Miller, supra note 9 (contrasting the national 
calls for black and Hispanic coalitions with frequent tension between the two groups at the 
local level). 
48. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (construing Thornburgh v. Gingles, 
478 U.S. 30 (1986)). 
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in which minority citizens are able to form coalitions with voters from 
other racial and ethnic groups, having no need to be a majority within a 
single district in order to elect candidates of their choice. Those 
candidates may not represent perfection to every minority voter, but 
minority voters are not immune from the obligation to pull, haul, and 
trade to find common political ground. 49 
Political coalitions forged across racial and ethnic lines are thus a more 
ideal alternative to a majority-minority district composed of a single 
minority.50 In other words, when feasible, jurisdictions are better 
served with apportionment schemes that promote, rather than inhibit, 
multiracial coalitions.51 
As a result, racial-apportionment schemes that are feasible in some 
areas of the country are simply not viable in others.52 For example, 
while demographic changes in the United States have not necessarily 
altered the operation of the VRA in many Southern, rural states, 
other regions have undergone (or will undergo) significant 
demographic changes that have yielded a multiracial, not biracial, 
society.53 Courts reviewing claims under section 5, therefore, must 
engage in the same "intensely local appraisal" required under section 
2 in order to ensure the viability of coalition districts to achieve 
nonretrogression.54 Judges must study voter demographics in order to 
be assured that the coalition is both legitimate and preserves an 
effective exercise of the franchise. Following the 2000 census, a three­
judge panel in New Jersey was able to make such an inquiry.55 
49. Id. at 1020 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. at 1019-20 ("It bears recalling . . .  that for all the virtues of majority-minority 
districts as remedial devices, they rely on a quintessentially race-conscious calculus aptly 
described as 'the politics of second best."' (quoting BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 136 (1992)). 
51. Id. at 1020. 
52. William H. Frey, Multiple Melting Pots, 15 WORLD & I 3641, May 1 ,  2000, available 
at 2000 WL 9050850. 
53. Calmore, supra note 8, at 1261-62 (citing Frey, supra note 52). 
54. Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (mandating an intense, local appraisal 
of voting blocs for claims under section 2 of the VRA). Absent such an intensely local 
appraisal, it is difficult to even determine which of the section 5 jurisdictions are capable of 
creating coalitions. For example, in Arizona, which is a covered jurisdiction, comparing the 
demographics of Yavapai County (86.6% white, non-Hispanic/Latino; 9.8% Hispanic/ 
Latino; and 1.6% American Indian/Alaska Native) with Graham County (55.2% white, non­
Hispanic/Latino; 27% Hispanic/Latino; and 14.9% American Indian/Alaska Native) 
indicates that the viability of coalitions in covered jurisdictions cannot be ascertained absent 
a careful examination of local demographics. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ARIZONA QUICK­
FACTS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html (last modified July 9, 2004). 
Assuming white bloc voting, the likelihood of an effective coalition in Yavapai County is 
much lower than the likelihood of such a coalition forming in Graham County. 
55. Other courts have engaged in similar inquiries as to the validity of multiracial 
coalitions. For example, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Midland Indepen­
dent School District, 812 F.2d 1494, 1500-01 (5th Cir. 1987), the Fifth Circuit found that an 
African-American group and a Hispanic group in west Texas '"have political goals that are 
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A. Coalition Building in New Jersey: The Example of Page v. Bartels 
Page v. Bartels focused on the post-reapportionment rights of 
African-American voters in New Jersey State Senate Districts 27, 28, 
29, and 34, which collectively elect four senators and eight assembly 
members to the New Jersey Legislature.56 Following each decennial 
census, New Jersey creates a bipartisan reapportionment commission 
responsible for determining the "representation of the various 
geographic areas of the state."5 7  After the Commission's acceptance of 
the plan submitted by the Democratic legislators, Republicans 
challenged it on the grounds that it had the purpose and effect of 
diluting minority (African-American) voting strength under section 2 
of the VRA.58 
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
held that the plaintiffs did not conclusively demonstrate that the 
inseparable. As such, coalition formation will often prove to be mutually beneficial to the 
two groups . . .  .' The bringing of this lawsuit by blacks and Hispanics is symbolic of their 
realization that, at least in Midland, Texas, they have common social, economic, and political 
interests which converge and make them a cohesive political group." Id. (quoting League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland lndep. Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 
606 (W.D. Tex. 1987)), vacated and rev'd on state law grounds by 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(en bane); see also Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 {5th Cir. 1988) 
(acknowledging the possibility for coalition suits under section 2 of the VRA), reh'g denied, 
849 F.2d 934 {5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989). Additionally, although the 
Eleventh Circuit did not find the existence of a multi-racial coalition in the specific instance 
litigated under section 2 of the VRA, it held that " [t]wo minority groups . . .  may be a 
single . . .  minority if they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive manner." 
Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v. Hardee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 
{1 1th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court, however, expressly avoided resolving the status of 
coalition districts in Crowe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 {1993). In Crowe, a unanimous Supreme 
Court refused to decide whether minority groups can be aggregated for the purposes of 
section 2 challenges. Crowe, 507 U.S. at 41 (reversing a finding that a Minnesota redistricting 
plan violated the VRA). But c.f Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
bane) {holding that coalition districts are not legitimate under section 2 of the VRA). In 
Nixon, however, the Sixth Circuit did not hold that minority groups will not form de facto 
coalitions. The decision was based on the language used in section 2 of the VRA, which 
"does not mention minority coalitions, either expressly or conceptually. Moreover, § 2 
consistently speaks of a 'class' in the singular." Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386. Thus, regardless of 
whether the Court fashions a test that permits the use of cross-racial aggregation in the 
section 2 context, such an aggregation would seem to work in the section 5 context. 
56. Page v. Bartels, 144 F. Supp. 2d 346 (D.N.J. 2001) (per curiam). Every citizen in New 
Jersey is represented by three legislators in the State House. Each of the forty legislative 
districts elects one senator and two assembly members at-large. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2, 
'll'll -4; see also Hirsch, supra note 2, at 8 {describing the factual background of Page). 
57. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3, 'lI 1. The New Jersey Constitution mandates that the 
chairmen of the two major political parties each appoint five members to an Apportionment 
Commission. If the Commission becomes deadlocked, the state constitution provides that 
the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court appoints a neutral eleventh member to the 
Commission. Following the 2000 census, and a subsequent deadlock by the Apportionment 
Commission, Chief Justice Deborah Poritz named Princeton University Professor Larry 
Bartels to serve as the eleventh member of the Commission. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 9. 
58. Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 349-50. 
200 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:189 
apportionment plan, which created multiple African­
American/Hispanic coalition districts, "will impair minorities' ability 
to elect their preferred candidate."59 While the implications of the 
plaintiff's section 2 claim are independently significant, both the facts 
of, and the reasoning behind the decision in Page provide insight into 
the debate over coalition districts. Viewed in the context of 
retrogression, the Court's findings could make a powerful imprint on 
the future of the section 5 jurisprudence. 
Compared to the 1991 apportionment plan, the plan enacted 
pursuant to the 2000 census actually reduced the percentage of the 
African-American voting age population ("AA YAP") and, more 
generally, the percentage of voting-age minorities ("MVAP") in 
Districts 27, 28, and 29.60 In exchange, however, District 34 gained a 
large number of African-American voters and nonminority 
Democratic voters.61 Additionally, under the 1991 plan, the AA VAP 
in Districts 27 and 28 were greater than 50%, indicating that African­
Americans had the opportunity to elect the candidate of their choice.62 
Following the 2001 apportionment, however, the AAVAP in these 
districts fell below 50%.63 
59. Id. at 364-65. 
60. Under the 1991 apportionment plan, the white voting age population ("WV AP"), 
African-American voting age population ("AAVAP"), Hispanic voting age population 
("HY AP"), total minority voting age population ("MY AP"), and Democratic voting age 
population ("DEM") were: 
DISTRICT WVAP AAVAP HVAP MVAP DEM 
27 31.4% 52.8% 9.4% 68.6% 86.0% 
28 20.4% 57.4% 16.8% 79.6% 87.1% 
29 20.9% 48.2% 26.2% 79.1% 86.7% 
34 76.8% 3.9% 11 .3% 23.2% 43.2% 
Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 14. Under the Bartels plan challenged 
in the litigation, the lines of these districts were redrawn and the minority voting percentages 
changed dramatically. The racial composition of the new districts was as follows: 
DISTRICT WVAP AAVAP HVAP MVAP DEM 
27 58.0%* 27.5% 6.6% 42.0% 57.1% 
28 30.3%* 48.3% 14.0% 69.7% 68.8% 
29 22.5%* 39.2% 33.2%* 77.5% 85.5% 
34 48.2% 35.3%* 9.8% 51.8%* 64.8%* 
The percentages marked with an asterisk (*) represent increases in the respective voting 
age population category from the 1990 plan. 
Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Hirsch, supra note 2, at 14. 
61. Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 353. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
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If New Jersey had been covered by section 5, 64 traditional 
principles of retrogression suggest that the 2001 plan would not have 
received preclearance from the Department of Justice. Because 
African-American voters in New Jersey had a reduced opportunity to 
dictate the outcome of the elections, the Bartels plan is retrogressive 
under a pre-Page and pre-Georgia v. Ashcroft analysis because it 
appears to have the effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race."65 
The Page court, however, made a clear statement that while the 
AAVAP decreased in Districts 27, 28 , and 29, the "Bartels plan . . .  
will enhance and expand the opportunity for African Americans and 
Hispanics to participate in a meaningful way in the political process. "66 
The court found that the reduction in AA V AP in District 27 from 
nearly 53% to 27% would not hinder the ability of minority groups to 
elect their favored candidates to the legislature.67 The court relied 
heavily on testimony from minority legislators, who suggested that 
while African-American and Latino voters do not always agree, they 
frequently agree on public-policy issues and tend to prefer the same 
legislative candidates.6 8 The court held that the Bartels plan 
sufficiently ensured that the minority voting population had an 
effective and forceful role in the political process.6 9 
The hypothetical preclearance dilemma in Page is that while the 
actual voting strength of African-American voters decreased in each 
of the districts, the effective voting strength of African-American 
voters increased due to potential coalition voting blocs and the 
addition of District 34 with a majority-MVAP population. Addition­
ally, in District 27, where both the AA V AP and MV AP were reduced 
to below 50% - potentially eliminating the ability of minority voters 
to control electoral outcomes - the percentage of Democratic voters 
remained above 50%.70 While the voting strength of African­
American voters in District 27 was, in effect, diminished, these same 
voters, largely Democrats, still had a partisan majority in the district, 
64. Only jurisdictions that are specifically mentioned in section 4 of the VRA must 
comply with the principles of retrogression outlined in section 5. See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000). 
66. Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (emphasis added). 
67. Id. 
68. Hirsch, supra note 2, at 8, 15 (noting that whites, African-Americans, and Latinos 
demonstrated the "significance of unity" throughout the redistricting process to avoid being 
left with a reapportionment plan that would have destroyed the possibilities of gaining 
majority in the state legislature); see also Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 366. 
69. Page, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 365. 
70. Where District 27 was 86% Democratic in the post-1990 census, it was 57.1 % 
Democratic following the 2000 census. See supra note 60. 
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and New Jersey retained an equal number of districts capable of 
electing a minority candidate.71 
If coalition districts, therefore, are found to enhance and expand 
the effective exercise of the electoral franchise for minority voters, 
even when there is a numerical reduction in individual minority voting 
populations, section 5 should be able to accommodate coalition 
districts without finding retrogression. In other words, had New Jersey 
been subjected to the requirements of section 5, under the Page 
court's interpretation of the effective minority voting power, as 
opposed to the actual voting power of minority groups, the 
Department of Justice likely would have granted preclearance to the 
apportionment plan. 
A section 5 doctrine that ignores the possibility of multiracial 
voting coalitions is thus incomplete. While the tendency of courts and 
the Justice Department is to view reapportionment plans with an eye 
towards a binary political framework,72 this dichotomy does not 
accurately represent the changing face of many voting populations. As 
the post-2000 Census redistricting process in New Jersey 
demonstrates, multiracial coalitions exist which must be considered by 
jurisdictions when redistricting. 
B. Georgia v. Ashcroft: A Subjective and Malleable Approach to 
Retrogression Analysis 
As Page indicates, multiracial coalitions can complicate traditional 
retrogression analysis. Fortunately, the analysis provided by the court 
in Georgia v. Ashcroft allows for a more detailed - though more 
difficult - determination of whether the effective voting strength of 
minority groups has been diminished, instead of whether the actual 
number or percentage of minority voters in a district has 
retrogressed.73 Georgia v. Ashcroft provides jurisdictions with 
increased freedom to draw apportionment maps. Although the issue 
of coalition districts was not before the Court, the Court's analysis can 
easily be read to permit jurisdictions with the freedom to draw 
coalition districts to achieve section 5 compliance.74 
71. See supra note 56. 
72. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text. See generally Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 
S. Ct. 2498 (2003). 
74. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2511-12; see also Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 
451, 480 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (arguing that Georgia v. Ashcroft permits the use of coalition 
districts to achieve nonretrogression under section 5); Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing 
Representation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2381 (2003) (assuming the applicability of Georgia 
v. Ashcroft to the coalition debate). 
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The problem, however, is one of proof . A state may not shift from 
majority-minority districts to coalition districts without demonstrating 
that either nonminority voters or voters of a different minority group 
will consistently vote with the benchmark majority-minority group.75 
Furthermore, where members of a minority group are placed into an 
"influence" district, the state must demonstrate that the minority 
group has effective influence rather than just some influence.76 This is 
by no means an easy task, but it is possible. While Justice Souter 
argued in his dissent that the increased flexibility provided to section 5 
analysis by Georgia v. Ashcroft leaves the nonretrogression principle 
"practically unadministrable," his concern fails to recognize that the 
Supreme Court has engaged in similar analyses under other voting 
rights doctrines.77 For example, in Thornburgh v. Gingles the Court 
outlined three factors as part of a test by which it carefully examines 
the presence of minority-group bloc voting patterns.7 8 The Gingles 
analysis, much like the analysis required by Georgia v. Ashcroft, 
requires courts to make a searching inquiry into racial voting patterns, 
demographics, and local political-voting patterns to determine 
whether minority groups have effective or some influence, or whether 
minority groups can form coalitions to create effective majority­
minority districts.79 
II. THE BA TILE BETWEEN GEORGIA V. A SHCROFT AND SHAW V. 
RENO: VIABLE COALITION DISTRICTS UNDER SECTION 5 AND THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
Section 5 of the VRA prohibits covered jurisdictions from making 
racially retrogressive changes to their voting practices. 80 As argued in 
Part I, under Georgia v. Ashcroft courts must engage in a searching 
inquiry regarding racial voting patterns in order to determine whether 
or not coalition districts are viable to achieve section 5 compliance. 
Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause proscribes jurisdictions 
75. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 
2518 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Bossier Parish I). 
76. Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 478; see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2518 
(Souter, J., dissenting). 
77. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2518 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
78. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). In order to make a claim for vote 
dilution under section 2, Gingles first requires the minority group to show that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district. Id. at 50. Second, the minority group must demonstrate its political cohesiveness. Id. 
at 51. Finally, the minority group must illustrate that the majority groups votes as a bloc, so 
as to enable the majority to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id. 
79. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2514 (noting the "fact-intensive" nature of the 
section 5 inquiry); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51 .  
80. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
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from using race as a predominant factor in redistricting if the use is not 
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. 81 
Current voting-rights jurisprudence, therefore, is inconsistent. 82 In 
essence, covered jurisdictions may not allow race to predominate over 
other factors, but redistricting plans must not be racially retrogressive 
under section 5 - a finding that frequently requires the use of race as 
a predominant factor. Even if a jurisdiction's use of race is predom­
inant under Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, the Supreme Court has not 
sufficiently explained what constitutes narrow tailoring at the cross­
roads of Shaw and section 5. 83 This Part  offers a solution to these 
inconsistencies in the context of multiracial coalition districts. By 
examining coalition districts in the broader context of voting-rights 
jur isprudence, this Part argues that where coalition districts can be 
created, narrow tailoring under the Equal Protection Clause requires 
their use in order to minimize the harms caused by race-based 
81. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
82. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct.. at 2517 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the 
"discord and inconsistency between §§ 2 and 5"); see also infra note 88. Applying Justice 
Kennedy's rationale, similar discord is also apparent between section 5 and the Equal 
Protection Clause. See, e.g. , Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
83. In general, jurisdictions have two options for using race-based redistricting. First, if 
the government allows race to predominate traditional districting principles, reviewing 
courts will only approve such use of race if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state interest. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying 
text. Although the application of strict scrutiny is not, doctrinally, fatal to all challenged 
plans, a review of Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that such a scheme is destined to 
fail. See, e.g. , Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1004, 1010 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that strict scrutiny need not be "fatal" and dissenting from the majority's application of the 
heightened form of review); Clark v. Putnam County, 293 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding 
Putnam County's redistricting plan unconstitutional because the use of race predominated 
and was not narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest). Alternatively, jurisdictions can 
avoid allowing race to predominate in order to lure a reviewing court away from applying 
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001) (indicating that when 
race is one factor among many, and does not supercede all other factors, strict scrutiny will 
not apply). In Easley, the Court indicated that politics, not race, dominated in the creation of 
North Carolina's twelfth congressional district. Id. at 258 (finding that the district court's 
rejection of the apportionment scheme under strict scrutiny was "clearly erroneous"); see 
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (indicating that 
the political question doctrine limits the ability of courts to review cases of partisan 
gerrymandering). 
Under either of these two models, the intentional creation of coalition districts to 
achieve section 5 compliance might enable a jurisdiction to survive judicial review. While the 
juxtaposition of coalition districts and traditional strict scrutiny analysis is discussed earlier 
in Part II.B, the intentional creation of coalition districts can also be used to avoid strict 
scrutiny analysis altogether. Viewed under the lens of Easley, the intentional use of race to 
create coalition districts in order to avoid retrogression might be sufficiently political and 
nonracial to encourage the court to refrain from applying strict scrutiny. See infra notes 95-
124 and accompanying text (comparing the relative harms of majority-minority districts and 
coalition districts). Regardless of whether coalition districts are seen as a means of 
complying with strict scrutiny or as a means of avoiding strict scrutiny, however, the crux of 
Part Il.B is that viable coalition districts are less harmful under the Equal Protection Clause 
than are majority-minority districts. 
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classifications. This Part also argues that such an interpretation of the 
relationship between section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause is a 
justified encroachment on federalism principles, but requires courts to 
be very cautious in granting preclearance to jurisdictions creating 
coalition districts. 
A. Discord and Inconsistencies: Section 5 and Equal Protection 
Underlying the Court's early opinions interpreting section 5 is the 
idea that "the Constitution does not prevent a State subject to the 
Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or preserving black 
majorities in particular districts in order to ensure that its 
reapportionment plan complies with § 5."84 Yet in Shaw v. Reno, the 
Court backtracked, indicating that section 5 does not give "covered 
jurisdictions carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering in the 
name of nonretrogression."85 The Court took this one step further in 
Shaw v. Hunt, indicating in dicta that section 5 compliance does not 
necessarily justify the use of race in redistricting. 86 While Hunt did not 
specifically hold that section 5 compliance is not a compelling state 
interest, the Court made clear that augmenting the effective power of 
minority voters under the guise of preventing retrogression is not a 
compelling interest. 87 
But any limitation on the ability to use race-based factors to 
achieve section 5 compliance in Shaw v. Hunt was at least implicitly 
84. United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) 
(plurality opinion); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976); City of 
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975). 
85. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After 
All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287, 308 ( 1996) 
(noting that the "abbreviated discussion [in Shaw v. Reno] of strict scrutiny at least 
suggested that compliance with either section 2's dilution principle or section S's 
retrogression standard could justify race-conscious districting"). 
86. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909-12 (1996). 
87. Id.; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (rejecting "the contention 
that the State has a compelling interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates 
the Justice Department issues"). That section 5 is not a compelling governmental purpose 
under strict scrutiny is also justified by one reading of the Supreme Court's decisions in City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Both cases involved remedial race-based classifications, where the 
use of race was designed to help, rather than hinder, minority groups. Together, these cases 
might be interpreted as standing for the proposition that remedying the specific effects of 
past discriminatory acts is the lone justification for race-conscious government action. The 
legislative history of section 5, however, indicates that its purpose is to remedy the societal 
effects of past discrimination. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996) (discussing Croson, 
488 U.S. at 498-509); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 
205-06. But c.f Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (holding that the attainment of a 
diverse student body is a compelling justification for a state's intentionally race-conscious 
admissions program). While Grutter indicates that race-based classifications are permissible 
for reasons other than remedying the specific effects of past discrimination, it does not 
relieve remedial plans of the burden to remedy specific instances of discrimination. 
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questioned by the Court's decision in Bush v. Vera, decided the same 
day as Hunt.88 In Vera, the Court held that the creation of Texas's 18th 
Congressional district was unconstitutional because it was "not 
narrowly tailored to the avoidance of § 5 liability."8 9 The Court cited 
Shaw v. Reno for the proposition that a redistricting plan that "went 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid retrogression" is not 
"narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression."90 This 
language indicates, contrary to the dicta in Shaw v. Hunt, that 
jurisdictions can consciously use race to comply with section 5 so long 
as the use of race is narrowly tailored to meet this goal. 91 
Taking into account the "reasonably necessary" language from the 
majority opinion in Vera, the Court's opinions present a view of strict 
scrutiny that enables states and localities to consciously create 
coalition districts in an effort to comply with section 5.92 In some cases, 
coalition districts established to achieve section 5 compliance may 
88. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (indicating that section 5 compliance can be 
considered a compelling state purpose under equal protection analysis). See J. Gerald 
Hebert, Redistricting in the Post-2000 Era, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 431 ,  454 (2000). 
Furthermore, a broad reading of the limitations implied by Shaw v. Hunt would raise doubt 
about the functional validity of section 5. See, e.g. , Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 
(2003) (Kennedy, J . ,  concurring) (noting that the "considerations of race that would doom a 
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 
5"). The Supreme Court has, however, indicated that the VRA continues to serve as a 
response to judicially recognized infringements of the constitutionally protected right to 
vote. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
640 (1999) (implying the validity of the VRA as a proper exercise of congressional authority 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-
20 (1997) (limiting Congress' authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
remedial measures). 
89. Vera, 517 U.S. at 983. Additionally, in a separately issued concurring opinion to her 
own plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that all jurisdictions have a compelling 
interest in complying with section 2 of the VRA, and those covered jurisdictions have a 
compelling interest in complying with section 5. Vera, 517 U.S. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). See also Katherine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A Small 
Treatise Accompanied by Districting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and Courts, 36 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 137, 207-08 (2002). Although the four dissenting justices did not join her 
concurrence, Justice O'Connor's opinion lends credence to the idea that section 5 
compliance is a compelling state interest. Vera, 517 U.S. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring); see also Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2517 (2003) (Kennedy, J., con­
curring) (acknowledging the disregard for the tension between sections 2 and 5 of the VRA). 
90. Vera, 517 U.S. at 983 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 655 (1993)). 
91. Vera, 517 U.S. at 983. 
92. The creation of coalition districts arguably forces jurisdictions to consider race more 
stringently than does the creation of majority-minority districts, because creating viable 
coalitions requires jurisdictions to engage in highly detailed analyses of racial bloc voting 
and racial crossover voting. As such, the use of coalition districts to achieve section 5 
compliance will likely force a court to invoke strict scrutiny under Miller v. Johnson. 515 
U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (noting that strict scrutiny must be invoked where the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that the legislature "subordinated traditional race-neutral districting prin­
ciples"). But see supra note 83 (noting that the creation of coalition districts might also 
enable courts to refrain from applying strict scrutiny in the first place). 
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satisfy Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, while majority-minority districts 
may not. So long as a coalition district is narrowly tailored to the goal 
of complying with section 5, the coalition district is constitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause: Narrow Tailoring and a Mandate of 
Viable Coalition Districts 
Given the Court's interpretation of the interplay between section 5 
of the VRA and the Equal Protection Clause, if a jurisdiction is 
presented with the option of creating either coalition districts or 
equally effective majority-minority districts in order to comply with 
section 5, the Equal Protection Clause mandates the creation of 
coalition districts.93 Coalition districts are more narrowly tailored 
under strict scrutiny than are majority-minority districts because they 
minimize the harms from racial classifications. By examining the 
harms that the Court has recognized in response to race-based 
classifications, both remedial94 and otherwise, as well as the rationale 
behind applying heightened scrutiny for race-based classifications, 
coalition districts emerge, for several reasons, as a partial solution to 
the tension between section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause. 
First, because race has been used for invidious purposes 
throughout America's past, the use of race-based classifications carries 
a stigmatic harm.95 Historically, racial classifications have served no 
93. Critical to this analysis is the assumption that a jurisdiction can create a functioning 
coalition district with sufficient racial crossover voting such that the apportionment scheme 
will not impair the effective exercise of the franchise for any minority group. 
94. Regardless of whether section 5 serves a compelling governmental purpose under a 
strict scrutiny analysis, section 5 is a remedial statute, and was specifically enacted as "a 
response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal 
courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck 
down." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57 
(1975)). See generally South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315-16 (1966) (discussing 
the history of the VRA). First, in enacting the legislation, Congress decided "'to shift the 
advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,' by 'freezing 
election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be 
nondiscriminatory."' Beer, 425 U.S. at 140 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1975) 
(quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 328, and 116 CONG. REC. 5519 (1970))). 
Second, section 5 is not universally applicable, indicating that Congress carefully targeted a 
response only to those districts that need it most. Third, Congress must reauthorize section 5 
every twenty-five years. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 101 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.S.C.A.N. 
177, 274. The time limitation establishes the legislation as "a temporary and exceptional 
remedy for problems of an exceptional character." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 102 (1983), 
reprinted in 1982 U.S.S.C.A.N. 177, 275. Finally, section 5 does not require any affirmative 
action on behalf of jurisdictions and their political subdivisions; it merely places demands on 
the subdivisions once they have affirmatively acted. 
95. See generally Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive 
Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9, 20 (2000) 
(proposing a "unified framework for strict scrutiny of race-conscious government action" 
and applying the framework to voting-rights cases). 
208 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:189 
purpose beyond degradation and humiliation. 96 The Supreme Court 
has noted "the policy of separating the races is  usually interpreted as 
denoting the inferiority" of the minority group, especially where the 
separation has the "sanction of law."97 Even in the context of remedial 
race-based classifications in voting-rights cases, the Court has found 
that harm results from the use of such classifications. 98 While the use 
of race-based classifications in a remedial context will be upheld if 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest, this does not 
eliminate harm. Under the Court's reasoning in Shaw v. Reno, the 
continued use of racial classifications, even in a benign context, serves 
to perpetuate the stigmatic harm created by such groupings. 9 9  
Coalition districts, however, are less stigmatic than majority­
minority districts.100 In an area in which the Court has explicitly stated 
"appearances do matter,''101 coalition districts are less visually obvious 
than are majority-minority districts. Unlike the bipolar districts 
challenged in Shaw v. Reno, coalition districts, by virtue of their 
multiracial nature,  do not bear the same "uncomfortable resemblance 
96. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559-60 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
97. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). 
98. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) ("Classifications of citizens solely on the 
basis of race 'are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality."' (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 
(1943))); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 173 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part) ("[E]ven in the pursuit of remedial objectives, an explicit 
policy of assignment by race may serve to stimulate our society's latent race consciousness, 
suggesting the utility and propriety of basing decisions on a factor that ideally bears no 
relationship to an individual's worth or needs."). 
99. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 643 (noting that racial classifications "threaten to 
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to incite racial 
hostility") .  But c.f Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (rejecting the notion that pure 
stigmatic harm to a member of a racial group can give that individual standing to challenge 
government action). While Allen indicates that a stigmatically harmed individual does not 
have standing, this does not necessarily mean that a harm does not exist for purposes of 
strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring. 
100. See Paulette M. Caldwell, The Content of Our Characterizations, 5 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 53, 68 (1999) ("[T]he dominant racial paradigm pits Blacks and Whites against each 
other."); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 821, 890 (1997) ("An interracial praxis, moving beyond the white-black 
jurisprudential paradigm, addresses intergroup prejudices and resentments as well as 
possibilities for healing and reconciliation. It focuses on the obstacle of felt injustice in the 
struggles of groups endeavoring to 'live together peaceably [and] work together politically."' 
(alteration in original) (quoting Eric K. Yamamoto, Rethinking Alliances: Agency, 
Responsibility and Interracial Justice, 3 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. LJ. 33 (1995)) ) . 
101. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added), quoted in Duckworth v. State 
Admin. Bd. of Elections, 332 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying Shaw to a challenge of 
unlawful race-based redistricting); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, 
Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts, " and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993) (discussing the Shaw 
inquiry). 
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to political apartheid. "102 This minimizes the idea that members of the 
same racial group think alike, 103 and reduces the stigma that can be 
created by separating races into distinct categories.104 As such, the use 
of coalition districts is less stigmatic to minority groups, even though 
the creation of coalition districts arguably demands that race be 
considered in a more detailed manner than does the creation of 
majority-minority districts. 
Second, in analyzing Shaw v. Reno, Professors Pildes and Niemi 
argue that the Court recognized a collective, "expressive" harm.105 
This interpretation of Shaw, later welcomed by the Court in Bush v. 
Vera,106 indicates that there is a constitutional harm "that results from 
the idea or attitudes expressed through a governmental action, rather 
than from the more tangible or material consequences the action 
brings about."107 Professors Pildes and Neimi interpret Shaw v. Reno 
to hold that where a government places too much emphasis on race, 
the state endorses the importance and usefulness of race-based 
classifications.10 8 The expressive harm felt by individuals categorized 
primarily by race forces these individuals to act not simply as voters, 
102. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647 (discussing "reapportionment plan[s] that include[] 
in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise separated by 
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another 
but the color of their skin"). The Shaw Court held that such a district "reinforces the 
perception that members of the same racial group . . .  think alike." Id. 
103. See id. 
104. The stigmatic harm is no less constitutionally infirm for remedial race-based 
classifications than it is for nonremedial race-based classifications. Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). As Justice Thomas argued in 
Adarand, a benign classification "teaches many that because of chronic and apparently 
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with [nonminorities] without their 
patronizing indulgence." Id. at 241. Justice Thomas's argument suggests that the harm of 
race-based classifications stretches beyond any individual and negatively affects the larger 
perception of the position of minorities in society. Id. (noting that remedial programs 
"engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who 
believe that they have been wronged by the government's use of race"). Thus, under Justice 
Thomas's argument, traditional racial classifications - in which one racial group is benefited 
at the expense of a different and unpopular racial group - are no different than remedial 
measures. Yet one can also argue that remedial race-based classifications appropriately 
acknowledge the differences between racial groups and the historical oppression of racial 
minorities, while supporting the idea that it is beneficial for society to work to remedy these 
past harms. See infra note 113 and accompanying text. Under this theory, coalition districts 
cause less stigmatic harm than do majority-minority districts. See supra notes 100-102 and 
accompanying text. 
105. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 101, at 506-07. 
106. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (plurality opinion) ("[W]e also know that 
the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the 
districting process, are such that bright-line rules are not available."). 
107. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 101, at 506-07. 
108. Id. 
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but as racial voters. 109 This harm is separate and distinct from the pure 
stigmatic harm discussed above; 1 10 it stems from the "social percep­
tion" of the state-endorsed use of race in redistricting, rather than the 
harm felt by any particular voter placed into a district solely because 
of her race. 1 1 1  The harm "reinforces racial stereotypes [across society 
as a whole] and threatens to undermine our system of representative 
democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a 
particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole."112 
While the intentional creation of coalition districts does not 
eliminate the expressive harm felt via the intentional creation of 
majority-minority districts, the conscious use of race to create 
coalitions sends a better message.113 Coalition districts simultaneously 
acknowledge the importance of race in society, and work to bridge the 
divide among the races. This type of pluralistic melting-pot theory 
contradicts the idea that all racial groups are distinct and polarized. 
Translating the expressive harm from Shaw v. Reno into the coalition 
context indicates that the social costs of the harm are outweighed by 
the social benefits. Coalition districts acknowledge that race matters 
and has played an important role in the socio-economic history of 
America, while also teaching that communities can recognize, 
appreciate, and overcome cultural differences between races. 1 14 This 
principle is further buttressed in a representational manner, when the 
elected official of one race has the full support of, and is able to 
effectively represent, coalition members of a different race.1 15 As such, 
109. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (noting that race-based classification in 
redistricting "reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group . . .  think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls"). 
110. Vera, 517 U.S. at 984 (recognizing the expressive harm). Professors Pildes and 
Niemi note that the expressive harm is separate and distinct from the purely stigmatic harm. 
Unlike the stigmatic harm, the expressive harm "is not concrete to particular individuals, 
singled out for distinct burdens. The harm instead lies in the disruption to constitutionally 
underwritten public understandings about the appropriate structure of values in some arena 
of public action." Pildes & Niemi, supra note 101, at 507. 
111 .  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 647-48 (emphasizing the "perception" created by race­
based classification and the "message" it sends); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 101, at 516. 
112. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 650. 
113. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1060, 1087 (1991) (advocating the position that race-consciousness can help validate "the 
lives and experiences of those who have been burdened because of their race"); Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1991) 
(arguing that color-blind constitutionalism has limited effectiveness in remedying racial 
discrimination). See generally Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (1990) 
(contrasting a commitment to integration with race-consciousness as models for breaking 
down racial barriers). 
1 14. Aleinikoff, supra note 1 13. 
115. See supra note 46. The idea of the "representational harm" comes from Shaw v. 
Reno, which notes that race-based redistricting will cause elected representatives to "believe 
that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of (the minority] group, rather 
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the expressive harm created by using race-based classifications in 
redistricting is reduced through the creation of coalition districts, and 
the societal gains are enlarged. 
Third, Shaw v. Reno also indicates that race-based classifications in 
redistricting can cause a more concrete, representational harm.116 
Because Shaw-style plaintiffs can be of any race, so long as they reside 
within the challenged district,117 minimizing the stigma or expressive 
harms for minority group members does not alleviate the burden felt 
by potential noncoalition plaintiffs. Those individuals who do not 
belong to the coalition are effectively deprived of voting power as a 
result of the race-based classifications. These, typically white, "filler 
people" experience a real, cognizable harm in the sense that their 
exercise of the franchise is effectively eliminated. Accordingly, race­
based redistricting may lead to a representational harm felt by filler 
people because it may lead representatives to "believe that their 
primary obligation is to represent only the members of [the minority] 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole. "118 
The creation of coalition districts does not necessarily alleviate the 
representational harm felt by members of a district who are not part of 
the majority-minority group. Drawing a coalition district instead of a 
majority-minority district will not eliminate the problem of the 
effectively disenfranchised group. This problem, however, is not 
merely one expressed in the context of race; it is simply a consequence 
of majoritarian democracy. Where two groups of any type are 
districted together, one necessarily will win at the expense of the 
other. For example, the Court has effectively ruled that partisan 
gerrymanders are permissible - despite the fact that a particular 
group loses an effective exercise of the franchise.119 That coalition 
than their constituency as a whole." Shaw, 509 U.S. at 648. But c.f Heather Gerken, 
Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1692 (2001)  (arguing 
that the Shaw majority has "backed away" from the idea of the representational harm in 
recent years). This harm is not felt as strongly where coalitions are created because 
representatives will have the support of, and will be able to effectively represent, all 
members of the coalition. 
116. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 648 ("[E]lected officials are more likely . . .  to represent 
only the members of [the majority] group."). The idea of a representational harm is also 
supported by the Supreme Court's holdings in United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995), 
and Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28 (2000),  which mandate that plaintiffs challenging 
apportionment schemes under the Equal Protection Clause reside within a challenged 
district in order to be "personally" harmed by an unconstitutional reapportionment. But 
while the Court acknowledged the possibility of expressive harms in Shaw v. Reno, it 
refrained from discussing whether representational harms actually exist. See Samuel 
Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 1 1 1  
HARV. L .  REV. 2276, 2285 n.48 (1998). 
1 17. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744-46 (1995). 
118. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 648. 
1 19. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
political gerrymandering is unconstitutional when the "electoral system is arranged in a 
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districts are more narrowly tailored under strict scrutiny does not 
require that the use of coalition districts mitigates all harms. Strict 
scrutiny in the section 5 reapportionment context requires that 
redistricting authorities not exceed what is "reasonably necessary" to 
avoid retrogression.120 
Finally, at its inception, strict scrutiny was a response to the idea 
that there was a need to protect "discrete and insular" minorities from 
the rule of the majority.121 In a famous footnote in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co. , Justice Stone indicated that a more stringent 
standard of review should apply to statutes directed at such minority 
groups.122 These groups, he felt, were not adequately protected by the 
political process, and thus needed a more "searching judicial inquiry" 
to protect against prejudice.123 Yet by definition, such districts indicate 
that component minority populations are no longer as discrete and 
insular as they once were; functioning coalition districts demonstrate 
that minority groups have successfully found at least some common 
political ground and can jointly serve to protect the interests of 
coalition members through the political process. The Court should not 
permit redistricting authorities to draw lines to keep a minority group 
discrete, when, in fact, its members have been able to forge common 
ground with other racial groups. Thus, while coalition members, by 
definition, no longer require the distinct and separate political 
protections afforded by majority-minority districts, coalition districts 
provide these groups with appropriate protections, while minimizing 
the harm caused by racial classifications. 
Because the relative harm caused by the use of coalition districts is 
smaller than the harm caused by the use of majority-minority districts, 
coalition districts are more narrowly tailored to achieve section 5 
compliance than are majority-minority districts. They are less blatant, 
less obvious, and less stigmatic than are majority-minority districts. By 
their very nature, " [r]acial classifications are simply too pernicious to 
permit any but the most exact connection between justification and 
classification."124 Coalition districts are the ideal that jurisdictions 
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the 
political process as a whole."). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004) (Scalia, J., 
plurality) (overruling Bandemer and holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable political questions). The Vieth plurality expressly noted, however, that 
partisan gerrymandering is perhaps incompatible with "democratic principles." Id. at 1785. 
120. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996) (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U.S. at 655). 
121. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144; 153 n.4 (1938). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (quoting Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
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subject to section 5 should strive to attain. They present a more exact 
connection and are more narrowly tailored than majority-minority 
districts. In short, equal protection demands their use. 
This Note does not imply that striving for coalition districts will be 
easy; as post-Gingles section 2 litigation has demonstrated, 
determining whether racial and ethnic groups forge coalitions is a very 
difficult task. As such, the Department of Justice and reviewing courts 
must bear in mind that the purpose of section 5 was to prevent districts 
from bending the rules to create racially discriminatory voting 
systems. Jurisdictions cannot be permitted simply to create coalition 
districts that mask racially discriminatory redistricting schemes when 
such districts are not viable. Such conduct would only continue to 
generate complex, lengthy, and statistically burdensome court battles. 
C. Back to the Beginnings: Federalism, Political Theories, and the 
Goals of Section 5 
The idea that the Equal Protection Clause mandates viable 
coalition districts raises two principal and related concerns. First, such 
a requirement expands an already large encroachment on states' 
rights. 125 Second, mandating coalition districts under section 5 conflicts 
with the goal, expressed in Georgia v. Ashcroft, of providing 
jurisdictions with increased flexibility to make their own political 
determinations under section 5 .126 This Section argues that while these 
two concerns do not preclude the mandate discussed in the preceding 
Section, they do give reason for courts to be cautious in conducting 
their analyses. 
With regard to the first concern, if the Supreme Court mandates 
viable coalition districts because such districts are more narrowly 
tailored than are majority-minority districts, the Court is expanding an 
already large encroachment on states' rights.127 As a general matter, 
125. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (acknowledging the 
"substantial 'federalism costs"' imposed by section 5) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 
900, 926 (1995)). See generally Ellen D. Katz, Federalism, Prec/earance, and the Rehnquist 
Court, 46 VJLL. L. REV. 1179, 1 181-82 (2001)  (arguing that the Court's willingness to further 
encroach on state sovereignty reflects its concern about institutional overreaching by the 
Department of Justice). But c.f Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has "[s]triv[ed) to assure itself and the public that announcing rights . . .  
involves much more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values on the States 
and the Federal Government . . . .  "), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
By mandating coalition districts, the Supreme Court is not imposing its own political values 
onto states, but is simply indicating that coalition districts are more narrowly tailored under 
strict scrutiny than are majority-minority districts composed of a single race. 
126. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 251 1-12 (2003). 
127. Even without the introduction of multiethnic coalitions into voting-rights juris­
prudence, section 5 has repeatedly been described as exacting "substantial 'federalism 
costs."' Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999) (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 
926); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don 't Have to be a Liberal to Hate the Racial 
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the relative scrutiny for equal-protection challenges is inversely 
proportional to federalism concerns. Under the reconciliation of 
section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause proposed above, states will 
have less freedom to make their own political determinations regard­
ing the viability of the coalitions. Although mandating viable coalition 
districts for compliance with section 5 involves a greater intrusion into 
state sovereignty, this intrusion remains in line with the goals of both 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA because it works to 
eliminate the problematic race-based voting structures enacted by 
covered jurisdictions.128 Because the Fourteenth Amendment can be 
read to require multiracial coalition districts, the intrusion on states 
rights is j ustified. 
While the goals of the coverage formula under section 4 of the 
VRA indicate that coalition districts would be beneficial to race 
relations, 129 courts must also be aware of districts that attempt to use 
coalition districts in the section 5 context. Section 5 only burdens those 
states and subdivisions that have been selected for coverage because 
"specified criteria suggest[] the presence of voting discrimination in 
the jurisdiction." 130 These jurisdictions have histories of discrimination 
in voting; thus courts must look with a special eye at these jurisdictions 
when they attempt to use a coalition district. If covered jurisdictions 
can sufficiently demonstrate that multiracial coalitions exist, section 5 
of the VRA should not be read to prohibit such coalitions. Such a 
prohibition, as noted in Justice Powell's dissent in City of Rome v. 
United States, would result in abuses of federalist principles and 
undermine the ability of states and political subdivisions to chart their 
own political course.131 
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998) (stating that the preclearance 
process is "an unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the states."); 
see also Katz, supra note 125, at 1 181-82 (noting that section 5 "dramatically shifts the 
balance of power between the federal government and the States and state subdivisions 
where it applies."); Mark E. Haddad, Note, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, 94 Yale L.J. 131, 140 (1984) ("Section 5 embodies an extraordinary grant of 
federal authority."). 
128. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
129. See supra note 18. 
130. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. at 269-70. 
131.  City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201-02 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the "encroachment [caused by section 5] is especially troubling because it destroys local 
control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our polity. Unless the 
federal structure provides some protection for a community's ordering of its own democratic 
procedures, the right of each community to determine its own course within the boundaries 
marked by the Constitution is at risk." (footnote omitted)); see also Growe v. Emison, 507 
U.S. 25, 34 (1993) (noting that "reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of 
the State through its legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court." (quoting 
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975)); Lawyer v. Dep't of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576 
(1997) (noting in dicta that "[a] State should be given the opportunity to make its own 
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The second key problem results from the Court's recent decision in 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, in which it clearly held that states should have the 
flexibility to make their own determinations regarding different 
"theor[ies] of effective representation. "132 Yet while states might be 
free to choose among different apportionment theories under section 
5, they are not released from the constitutional requirement of equal 
protection.133 A redistricting plan that is permissible under section 5 is 
not necessarily in accord with equal-protection principles. While this 
ultimately suggests an outcome contrary to the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft, that case is easily distinguished 
because the Court was asked to consider neither the role of multiracial 
populations nor the redistricting scheme under the Equal Protection 
Clause. As such, it remains an open question whether states really 
enjoy the amount of flexibility that Georgia v. Ashcroft implies, given 
equal-protection constraints.134 Regardless, accepting the proposed 
reconciliation between section 5 and the Equal Protection Clause 
necessitates a choice between political theories: either jurisdictions 
should have the power to make race count in redistricting more than 
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny currently permit, or the federal 
government should further constrain the ability of states to make their 
own political determinations.135 
CONCLUSION 
Compliance with section 5 of the VRA is not an easy task given 
the additional constraints placed on redistricting by section 2 and the 
Equal Protection Clause. Because of changing racial demographics, 
the "discord and inconsistencies" between these doctrines continue to 
grow. The Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft permits 
jurisdictions to draw multiracial coalition districts, while other 
doctrines suggest that reapportioning authorities are unable to 
redistricting decisions so long as that is practically possible and the State chooses to take the 
opportunity."). 
132. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2498, 2512 (2003); see also Katz, supra note 74, at 
2381 (noting the "unprecedented" discretion given to covered jurisdictions to shape their 
electoral districts in the preclearance process). 
133. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. at 2517 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (noting that while 
section 5 precedent controlled the decision, future cases may raise similar issues within a 
broader context of equal protection and section 2 jurisprudence). 
134. Id. 
135. But see Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54, 556 (1946) (arguing that courts 
should refrain from deciding controversies concerning "matters that bring courts into 
immediate and active relations with party contests . . . .  It is hostile to a democratic system to 
involve the judiciary in the politics of the people," and consequently "[c]ourts ought not to 
enter this political thicket."). But c.f Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566-67 (1964) (noting 
that "a denial of constitutionally protected rights demands judicial protection . . . .  To the 
extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen."). 
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consider race in the redistricting process. This Note suggests that the 
Equal Protection Clause requires the use of multiracial coalition 
districts, where possible, in order to achieve section 5 compliance.136 
Yet courts must beware: the use of coalition districts in this manner 
may allow malintentioned districts to manipulate the political 
process.137 The Justice Department and the courts must take careful 
note that in jurisdictions where multiracial voting coalitions are not 
viable, the reapportioning authority can, under the guise of creating 
properly functioning coalition districts, disperse the minority vote and 
functionally disenfranchise the minority voters. Despite this 
possibility, however, and given the inherent contradictions in much of 
the Court's voting-rights jurisprudence, viable coalition districts offer 
a functional means through which reapportioning authorities can 
navigate the murky waters of redistricting. 
136. Such a reading would also enable Congress to reauthorize section 5 with the 
confidence that the statute continues to benefit minority voting rights. See generally Samuel 
Issacharoff, ls Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own Success, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1710 (2004) (questioning whether section 5 has served its purpose and should be 
allowed to lapse when it expires in 2007). 
137. See Katz, supra note 7, at 2381-82 (questioning whether post-Georgia v .  Ashcroft 
retrogression analysis will provide a "meaningful curb on racial discrimination"); Pamela S.  
Karlan, Georgia v .  Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L. J.  21, 36 
(2004) (noting that "[g]utting section 5 . . .  is  itself a retrogression in minority voters' effective 
exercise of the electoral franchise"). 
